Method and system of communication using extended sequence number

ABSTRACT

Described is a method by mobile equipment to communicate with a network. The method includes receiving a network authentication token having a first message authentication code, an authentication message field and a first extended sequence number that includes a first hardware identifier and first sequence number, and authenticating the network based on the first message authentication code, the first hardware identifier, and the first sequence number.

BACKGROUND

1. Field the of the Invention

The present invention relates to a method and system for wirelesscommunication using an extended sequence number.

2. Description of Related Art

Security methods and processes relating to wireless communications haveevolved in recent years. In particular, 2G CDMA security evolved into 3GCDMA security, and many of the same characteristics of 3G CDMA securityare now incorporated into IMS systems as briefly described below.

As is well known in the art, 2G CDMA security involves cellularauthentication and voice encryption (CAVE). Generally, in a 2G CDMAsecurity protocol, a home location register (HLR) or authenticationcenter (AC) of a network sends a challenge including a random number anda secondary key (SSD). The challenge is based on a 64-bit root keycommonly referred to as the A-key, which is stored in the HLR or AC. Inresponse to the challenge, the mobile equipment of a subscriber providesa response (AUTHR). The mobile equipment also stores the A-key.Accordingly, the mobile equipment using a CAVE on the random number andsecondary key extracted from the challenge, and the A-key, prepares theAUTHR. The AUTHR, which is transmitted back to the HLR, allows the HLRto authenticate the mobile equipment. Conventional 2G CDMA securityprotocols generally do not provide mutual authentication. Because 2GCDMA security protocols are well-known in the art, further details arenot described herein for the sake of brevity.

Conventional 3G CDMA security protocols are based on an authenticationkey agreement (AKA) and provide mutual authentication meaning (i) themobile equipment authenticates the network and (ii) the networkauthenticates the mobile equipment before communications are performed.The well-known AKA security protocols used in 3G CDMA are based onquintuplets. Quintuplets include a random number RAND, expected responseXRES, cipher key CK, integrity key IK and network authentication tokenAUTN. A conventional network authentication token AUTN is based on asequence number SQN, an anonymity key AK, authentication managementfield AMF and a message authentication code MAC. It is noted that inconventional 3G CDMA security protocols, the sequence number does notinclude a hardware identifier of the mobile equipment.

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a method of creating the conventionalnetwork authentication token AUTN and a conventional messageauthentication vector AV, which may be performed by an AC of thenetwork.

As shown in the diagram of FIG. 1, the message authentication code MACis generated using function f1 to process a secret key K, theauthentication management field AMF, a sequence number SQN, and therandom number RAND. FIG. 1 also illustrates that the remainingcomponents of the conventional authentication vector AV is created usingfunctions f2-f5 to process the secret key K and the random number RANDto generate an expected response XRES, cipher key CK, integrity key IK,and anonymity key AK, respectively. One skilled in the art willappreciate the functions f1-f5 could be a variety of functions wellknown in the art and thus, the specifics of the functions are omittedherein for the sake of brevity.

Once the conventional authentication vector AV is generated by the AC ofthe network, the authentication vector AV is transmitted to a servingsystem of the network providing service to the mobile equipment of thesubscriber. The serving system extracts the network authentication tokenAUTN and the random number RAND from the authentication vector AV andprovides the network authentication token AUTN and the random-numberRAND to the mobile equipment.

As mentioned above with respect to FIG. 1, the AUTN includes thesequence number SQN, authentication management field AMF and the messageauthentication code MAC. The mobile equipment extracts the sequencenumber SQN and the message authentication code MAC from the networkauthentication token AUTN and authenticates the network based on thesequence number SQN and message authentication code MAC.

In particular, the mobile equipment generates its own messageauthentication code MAC based on a sequence number SQN stored in themobile equipment, a secret key K stored in the mobile equipment, theAMF, and the random number RAND. Then, the message authentication codeMAC generated at the mobile equipment is compared with the MAC extractedfrom the network authentication token AUTN received from the servingsystem. Still further, the mobile equipment may determine if thesequence number SQN extracted from the network authentication token isan acceptable value. For example, the mobile equipment may determine ifthe sequence number extracted from the network authentication token iswithin an acceptable range to verify the sequence number SQN. If themobile equipment successfully authenticates the network, the mobileequipment prepares a response RES and transmits the response RES back tothe serving system of the network. The serving system of the networkthen compares the expected response XRES with the response RES toauthenticate the mobile equipment, thereby completing a mutualauthentication according to the conventional AKA security protocol.

If the mobile equipment during the authentication process determines themessage authentication code MAC, which was extracted from the networkauthentication token AUTN, does not match the MAC generated in themobile equipment, the mobile equipment transmits a failure message tothe serving system of the network. Further, if the mobile equipmentduring the authentication process determines the MAC value, which wasextracted from the network authentication token AUTN matches the MACvalue generated by the mobile equipment, but that the sequence numberSQN is outside of the permissible range, the mobile equipment transmitsa resynchronization message to the network. As previously mentioned, theAKA security protocol used in 3G CDMA is well known in the art and thus,further information is not provided herein for the sake of brevity.

Conventional IMS security protocols have essentially incorporated thequintuplet based AKA security protocol described above with respect to3G CDMA. However, in the IMS security mechanism, an HTTP AKA digest islocated in an intermediary network component between the AC and themobile equipment. For example, the HTTP AKA digest may be included inthe S-CSCF of an IMS network. The HTTP AKA digest reconfigures theconventional authentication vector AV to be in the proper format forprocessing by various other components of the IMS network. Furtherdetails on the specifics of the HTTP AKA digest and AKA securityprotocol conventionally used in an IMS network can be found in the 3GPPTS 33.203 VT.4.0 standard published in December of 2006. As such,further details of the conventional IMS security protocols are omittedherein for the sake of brevity.

While security protocols have evolved by transitioning from 2G CDMAsecurity protocols to 3G CDMA security protocols, which are alsoimplemented in conventional IMS security protocols, some of the hardwareequipment used for wireless communications has not been updated and/oris not capable of processing the more highly evolved protocols. Forexample, some companies which may have invested significant amounts oftime, research and money in hardware used to process 2G CDMA securityprotocols have chosen not to update the hardware for various costassociated reasons. For example, some wireless devices such as mobilephones, PDAs, etc. are only capable of extracting the random number RANDand sequence number SQN from a challenge, as discussed above withrespect to the 2G CDMA security protocols, and providing a responseAUTHR consistent with the 2G CDMA security protocol. Therefore, someconventional 2G CDMA hardware devices are not currently capable ofproviding a mutually authenticated communication channel with an IMSnetwork.

SUMMARY

Example embodiments provide methods and apparatuses related toestablishing communications between mobile equipment and a network usingan extended sequence number. According to example embodiments, theextended sequence number includes at least a portion of the hardwareidentifier of the mobile equipment.

An example embodiment provides a method performed by mobile equipment tocommunicate with a network. The method includes receiving a networkauthentication token having a first message authentication code and afirst extended sequence number that includes a first hardware identifierand first sequence number; and authenticating the network based on thefirst message authentication code and the first sequence number. Themethod performed by the mobile equipment may further include extractingthe first message authentication code and the first extended sequencenumber from the network authentication token; calculating a secondmessage authentication code based on the random number, the firstextended sequence number, and a key stored in the mobile equipment; andseparating the first extended sequence number to obtain the firsthardware identifier and a first sequence number.

According to an example embodiment, the authenticating step compares thefirst message authentication code with the second message authenticationcode, the first hardware identifier with a second hardware identifierstored in the mobile equipment, and the first sequence number and asecond sequence number stored in the mobile equipment; and authenticatesthe network if the first message authentication code matches the secondmessage authentication code, the first hardware identifier matches thesecond hardware identifier, and the first sequence number is greaterthan the second sequence number.

According to an example embodiment, the first hardware identifier refersto a mobile equipment associated with a subscriber of the network andthe second hardware identifier identifies the mobile equipment thatreceived the network authentication token and random number.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the mobileequipment further includes generating a resynchronization pair if atleast one of the first message authentication code does not match thesecond message authentication code, the first hardware identifier doesnot match the second hardware identifier, and the first sequence numberis less than the second sequence number; and transmitting theresynchronization pair to the network.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the mobileequipment further includes reallocating bits of a first protocolresynchronization pair having a preset number of bits assigned to eachof a first protocol resynchronization message and a first protocolsequence number; transmitting a second resynchronization pair having thesame number of bits as the first protocol resynchronization pair. Thebits reallocated in the reallocating step are used as bits of the secondextended sequence number that has a greater number of bits than thefirst protocol sequence number.

Another example embodiment provides a method performed by a network tocommunicate with mobile equipment. The method includes transmitting arandom number and an authentication token having a first extendedsequence number, which includes a hardware identifier of the mobileequipment associated with a subscriber; and receiving a response fromthe transmitting step, the response being at least one of acryptographic transformation of the random number and aresynchronization pair including a second extended sequence number and aresynchronization message.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the networkfurther includes generating a first authentication vector including thenetwork authentication token. The first authentication vector is aconcatenation of the random number, an expected response, a cipher key,an integrity key, and the authentication token.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the networkfurther includes comparing the response from the transmitting step tothe expected response; and authenticating the mobile equipment if theresponse from the transmitting step matches the expected response.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the networkfurther includes comparing the response from the transmitting step tothe expected response; and generating a second authentication vectorincluding a second network authentication token having the secondextended sequence number if the response from the transmitting step doesnot match the expected response; and transmitting the secondauthentication token to the mobile equipment.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the networkfurther includes detecting an indicator included in the response fromthe transmitting step; authenticating the mobile if the indicatorindicates the response is a cryptographic transformation of the randomnumber and the cryptographic transformation of the random number matchesthe expected response; and generating a second authentication vectorincluding a second network authentication token having the secondextended sequence number if the indicator indicates the response is theresynchronization pair; and transmitting the second authentication tokento the mobile equipment.

According to an example embodiment, the method performed by the networkfurther includes reallocating bits of a first protocol networkauthentication token, which has a preset number of bits assigned to eachof a first protocol sequence number and a message authentication code;and generating an authentication vector including a second protocolnetwork authentication token. The second protocol network authenticationtoken has the same number of bits as the first protocol networkauthentication token, and the reallocated bits are used as bits of thefirst extended sequence number that has a greater number of bits thanthe first protocol sequence number.

Still another example embodiment provides a method of establishing amutually authenticated communication channel between mobile equipmentand a network. The method includes (a) generating an expected response,a random number, and a network authentication token including a firstmessage authentication code and a first extended sequence number havinga first hardware identifier being associated with the mobile equipmentby the network; (b) transmitting the random number and the networkauthentication token from the network to the mobile equipment; (c)receiving the random number and the network authentication token at themobile equipment; (d) authenticating the network based on the networkauthentication token; (e) transmitting a cryptographic transformation ofthe random number from the mobile equipment to the network; (f)authenticating the mobile equipment if the cryptographic transformationof the random number matches the expected response; and (g) establishinga mutually authenticated channel between the mobile station and thenetwork.

According to an example embodiment, the network authenticating step (d)extracts the first message authentication code, and the first extendedsequence number from the authentication token; calculates a secondmessage authentication code based on the random number, the firstextended sequence number, and a key stored in the mobile equipment;separates the first extended sequence number to obtain the firsthardware identifier and a first sequence number; compares the firstmessage authentication code with the second message authentication code,the first hardware identifier with a second hardware identifier storedin the mobile equipment, and the first sequence number with a secondsequence number stored in the mobile equipment; and authenticates thenetwork if the first message authentication code matches the secondmessage authentication code, the first hardware identifier matches thesecond hardware identifier, and the first sequence number is greaterthan the second sequence number.

According to an example embodiment, the method of establishing themutually authenticated channel further includes resynchronizing themobile equipment and the network if at least one of the first messageauthentication code does not match the second message authenticationcode, the first hardware identifier does not match the second hardwareidentifier, and the first sequence number is less than the secondsequence number.

According to an example embodiment, the resynchronizing step includesconcatenating the second hardware identifier and the second sequencenumber to create a second extended sequence number; calculating aresynchronization message based on the random number, the secondextended sequence number, and a key stored in the mobile equipment;grouping the second extended sequence number with the resynchronizationmessage to form the resynchronization pair; transmitting theresynchronization pair; generating a second network authentication tokenusing the second extended sequence number, and repeating the steps(b)-(f) referred to above while substituting the second networkauthentication token for the network authentication token.

Another example embodiment provides a method performed by mobileequipment to communicate with a network. The method includes receiving anetwork authentication token having a first message authentication codeand a first extended sequence number that includes a hash of a firsthardware identifier and first sequence number; and authenticating thenetwork based on the first message authentication code, the hash of thefirst hardware identifier, and the first sequence number.

Another example embodiment provides a method performed by a network tocommunicate with mobile equipment. The method includes transmitting arandom number and an authentication token having a first extendedsequence number, which includes a hash of a first hardware identifier ofthe mobile equipment associated with a subscriber; and receiving aresponse from the transmitting step. The response is at least one of acryptographic transformation of the random number and aresynchronization pair including a second extended sequence number and aresynchronization message.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention will become more fully understood from thedetailed description given herein below and the accompanying drawings,wherein like elements are represented by like reference numerals, whichare given by way of illustration only and thus are not limiting of thepresent invention and wherein:

FIG. 1 illustrates a method of providing a conventional authenticationvector and a conventional network authentication token, which may beused in various conventional security protocols;

FIG. 2 illustrates a communication system according to an exampleembodiment;

FIG. 3 illustrates a mobile equipment according to an exampleembodiment;

FIG. 4 illustrates a method of generating a network authentication tokenand authentication vector according to an example embodiment;

FIG. 5 illustrates an example embodiment of a signal flow diagram;

FIGS. 6A and 6B are a flow chart illustrating an example embodiment of amethod performed by a mobile equipment to authenticate a network; and

FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating an example embodiment of a methodperformed by a network to authenticate a mobile equipment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

FIG. 2 illustrates a communication system 10 including at least onemobile station 100 and a network 20. One skilled in the art willappreciate that the network 20 should not be limited to the abbreviatedportion of an IP multi-media sub-system (IMS), which is illustrated inthe embodiment of FIG. 2. In FIG. 2, the IMS network 20 includes an IMShome system 300, an IMS visited system 400 and intermediary IMScomponents 200. While the intermediary IMS components 200 are merelyshown as a block in the network 20, one skilled in the art willappreciate that the intermediary IMS components 200 may include, forexample, a P-CSCF, and I-CSCF, an HSS, and an S-CSCF arranged betweenthe mobile equipment 100 and the IMS home system 300 and IMS visitedsystem 400. The IMS home system 300 and the IMS visited system 400 maycommunicate with each other directly or via the intermediary IMScomponents 200 to provide service to the mobile equipment 100. Thelocation of the mobile equipment, type of service requested by themobile equipment, etc., may determine whether the IMS home system 300 orthe IMS visited system 400 provides the requested service to the mobileequipment 100.

According to the example embodiment as described with respect to FIG. 2,the IMS home system 300 includes an authentication center 310. Thesimplified version of the authentication center 310 illustrated in FIG.2 includes a memory 312, a processor 314, and a transceiver 316.Obviously one skilled in the art will appreciate that the authenticationcenter 310 is more complex than the simplified version illustrated inFIG. 2 and may include one or more computer systems.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example embodiment of mobile equipment 100. Asshown in FIG. 3, the mobile equipment 100 includes a removable useridentity module RUIM, a memory 120, a processor 130 and a transceiver140. The removable user identity module RUIM included in the mobileequipment 100 is a conventional removable user identity module RUIM. Forexample, the removable user identity module RUIM may be a module thatwas developed to function according to the 2G CDMA security protocols.As such, the removable user identity module RUIM may store aMIN/IMSI/TMSI as is well known in the art and will not be discussedfurther herein for the sake of brevity. The memory 120 and the processor130 of the mobile equipment 100 may be used to perform exampleembodiments of methods described below with respect to the signal flowdiagram of FIG. 5 and the flow chart of FIG. 6.

Before describing example embodiments of methods for authenticationaccording to the present invention, introduction of an extended sequencenumber used in the methods is explained with respect to FIG. 4.

According to example embodiments, the mobile equipment 100 and theauthentication center 310 provide additional functionality to addressdeficiencies of the conventional removable unit identity module RUIM 110included in the mobile equipment 100. The example embodiment of themobile equipment 100 and the example embodiment of the authenticationcenter 310 do this using an extended sequence number ESQN. An extendedsequence number ESQN according to an example embodiment is a globallynon-repeating sequence number for all mobile equipment. According to oneexample embodiment, the extended sequence number ESQN includes ahardware identifier of a subscriber's mobile equipment 100 and anexample embodiment of a sequence number SQN′. In particular, theextended sequence number ESQN is the hardware identifier of the mobileequipment 100 concatenated with the sequence number SQN′.

Because the ESQN includes the hardware identifier of a subscriber'smobile equipment 100, and each mobile equipment 100 has a differenthardware identifier, the ESQN is different for each mobile equipment100. Further, because the ESQN includes a sequence number SQN′, the ESQNmay be incremented for each system access similar to how a sequencenumber SQN is incremented in a conventional AKA security protocol.Stated differently, the ESQN does not repeat within a mobile equipment100 and is different for each different mobile equipment 100 that theremovable user identity module RUIM is inserted into. According to oneexample, an ESQN includes 104 bits with 56 bits being allocated to thehardware identifier and 48 bits being allocated to an example embodimentof a sequence number SQN′.

According to an example embodiment, the sequence number SQN′ included inan extended sequence number ESQN may be based on a time determined bythe mobile equipment 100, or on a counter value, for example. A timebased sequence number SQN′ is determined based on a clock value that maybe 0.1 seconds, for example, so that no two batch request may arrivesimultaneously. An example of a sequence number SQN′ based on timeincludes 47 bits in which 5 of the 47 bits are used for arraymanagement. This example sequence number SQN′ would supportapproximately 65 years of operations. An example of a sequence numberSQN′ based on a counter includes 34 bits assuming 1 AKA/sec is the worstcase rate, a lifetime of a mobile equipment 100 is around 15 years and amechanism for allowing interleaving of requests from different visitedIMS systems 400 is used requires 5 of the 34 bits. As indicated by thesetwo examples, the number of bits for the sequence number SQN′ may varydepending on the characteristics of the IMS network 20 and/or the mobileequipment 100.

FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating how the extended sequence number ESQNmay be used in an authentication center 310 to generate an exampleembodiment of the authentication vector AV′. The memory 312 of theauthentication center 310 may store various values such as a secret keyK and various functions represented by f6-f10 used by the processor 314of the authentication center 310 to generate the authentication vectorAV′. One skilled in the art will appreciate the functions f6-f10 couldbe a variety of functions well known in the art and thus, the specificsof the functions are omitted herein for the sake of brevity.

As illustrated in FIG. 4, the processor 312 generates a messageauthentication code MAC′ value by performing the process f6 with thesecret key K, authentication message field AMF, extended sequence numberESQN, and random number RAND. Further, the processor 314 generates aexpected response XRES based on the secret key K and the random numberRAND using the process f7; generates the cipher key CK based on thesecret key K and the random number RAND with the process f8; generatesthe integrity key IK based on the secret key K and the random numberRAND using process f9; and generates the anonymity key AK′ based on thesecret key K and random number RAND using process f10. The processor 314may then generate an example embodiment of an authentication token AUTN′using equation (1) shown below.

AUTN′:=ESQN⊕AK′∥AMF∥MAC′  (1)

As such an authentication vector AV′ according to an example embodimentis based on the extended sequence number ESQN, anonymity key AK′,authentication message field AMF, and message authentication code MAC′.

Still further, the processor 314 calculates an example embodiment of anauthentication vector AV′ based on equation (2) shown below.

AV′:=RAND∥XRES∥CK∥IK∥AUTN′  (2)

As illustrated by equation 2, an example embodiment of an authenticationvector AV′ may be a concatenation of the random number RAND, expectedresponse XRES, cipher key CK, integrity key IK, and networkauthentication token AUTN′.

FIG. 5 is a signal flow diagram illustrating communications between themobile equipment 100, intermediary IMS components 200 a and the IMS homesystem 300 according to an example embodiment. It is noted that theintermediary IMS components 200 a differ slightly from the intermediaryIMS components 200 shown in FIG. 2 in that intermediary IMS components200 a is considered to include the IMS visited system 400, which isconsidered the serving system in the example embodiment described belowwith respect to FIG. 5. In addition to the IMS visited system 400, theintermediary IMS components 200 a may further include a P-CSCF, anI-CSCF, a HSS, an S-CSCF, for example.

FIG. 5 illustrates the mobile equipment 100 sending a service request tothe IMS home system 300 requesting service (1). In response to theservice request, the IMS home system 300 generates an example embodimentof an authentication vector AV′, as previously described with respect toFIG. 4.

Once the IMS home system 300 generates the authentication vector AV′,the IMS home system 300 provides the authentication vector AV′ to theintermediary IMS components 200 a (2). The intermediary IMS components200 a then process the authentication vector AV′ to extract the randomnumber RAND, the expected response XRES, the cipher key CK, theintegrity key IK, and the network authentication token AUTN′ from theauthentication vector AV′. The intermediary IMS components 200 adetermine the extended sequence number ESQN and a first messageauthentication code MAC′ from the network authentication token AUTN′ andstore the expected response XRES, cipher key CK and integrity key IK,which are used to process a later response received from the mobileequipment 100.

The intermediary IMS components 200 a provide the network authenticationtoken AUTN′ and the random number RAND to the mobile equipment 100 (3).The mobile equipment 100 receives and processes the networkauthentication vector AUTN′ and the random number RAND to authenticatethe IMS network 20.

The flow chart shown in FIGS. 6A-6B illustrates an example embodiment ofa method performed by the mobile equipment 100 to authenticate the IMSnetwork 20. In step S100 of FIG. 6, the transceiver 140 of the mobileequipment 100 receives the network authentication token AUTN′ and therandom number RAND_(N) from the intermediary IMS components 200 a. Thetransceiver 140 may provide the network authentication token AUTN′ andthe random number RAND_(N) to the processor 130 and/or store the networkauthentication token AUTN′ and the random number RAND_(N) in the memory120, which can be accessed by the processor 130.

In step S105, the mobile equipment 100 extracts the first messageauthentication code MAC′_(N), the first extended sequence numberESQN_(N), and the authentication message field AMF from the networkauthentication token AUTN′. In particular, the processor 130 extractsthe first message authentication code MAC′_(N), the first extendedsequence number ESQN_(N), and the authentication message field AMF fromthe network authentication token AUTN′ and stores the first messageauthentication code MAC′_(N), the first extended sequence numberESQN_(N) and the authentication message field AMF in the memory 120 ofthe mobile equipment 100.

In step S110 of FIG. 6, the mobile equipment 100 calculates a secondmessage authentication code MAC′_(ME). The second message authenticationcode MAC′_(ME) is calculated using a secret key K stored in theremovable unit identity module RUIM, the random number RAND_(N) receivedfrom the network 20, and the first extended sequence number ESQN_(N) andauthentication message field AMF extracted from the networkauthentication token AUTN′ in step S105. For example, the processor 130combines the secret key k, the first extended sequence number ESQN_(N),the random number RAND_(N) and the authentication message field AMFusing function f6, which was previously mentioned in the description ofFIG. 4, to generate the second message authentication code MAC′_(ME).

In step S115, the mobile equipment 100 determines if the first messageauthentication code MAC′_(N) matches the second message authenticationcode MAC′_(ME). The processor 130 of the mobile equipment 100 may makethis determination. Based on the determination of the processor 130 ofthe mobile equipment 100, the processor 130 may perform step S120 orstep S155. In particular, if the processor 130 determines the firstmessage authentication code MAC′_(N) matches the second messageauthentication code MAC′_(ME), the processor 130 performs step S120,whereas if the processor 130 determines the first message authenticationcode MAC′_(N) does not match the second message authentication codeMAC′_(ME), the processor performs step S155. Because step S155 isdescribed in greater detail below with respect to FIG. 6 b, thisdescription of an example embodiment will proceed under the assumptionthat the first message authentication code MAC′_(N) matches the secondmessage authentication code MAC′_(ME). It noted that according toanother example embodiment, a failure signal is transmitted to thenetwork 20 if the mobile equipment 100 determines the first messageauthentication code MAC′_(N) does not match the second messageauthentication code MAC′_(ME). Further, because all the variable used tocalculate the first message authentication code MAC′_(N) and the secondmessage authentication code MAC′_(ME) are the same except the respectivesecret keys K_(N) and a K_(ME) and the function, there is an increasedlikelihood that one or more components of the network 20 and/or mobileequipment 100 has suffered a malfunction and thus, be unable toresynchronize.

In step S120, the mobile equipment 100 processes the first extendedsequence number ESQN_(N) extracted from the network authentication tokenAUTN′. For example, the processor 130 separates the first extendedsequence number ESQN_(N) into the first sequence number SQN′_(N) and afirst hardware identifier ID_(N). The first hardware identifier ID_(N)is the hardware identifier the network 20 associates with a subscriberof the IMS service. For example, when a subscriber registers forservice, the subscriber may provide the authentication center 310 of theIMS home system 300 with the hardware identifier of the subscriber'smobile equipment and the authentication center may store thisinformation in a subscriber profile stored in the memory 314, forexample.

In step S125, the mobile equipment 100 compares the first hardwareidentifier ID_(N) with the second hardware identifier ID_(ME). Thesecond hardware identifier ID_(ME) is the hardware identifier of themobile equipment 100 in which the removable unit identity module RUIMused by the used subscriber is inserted. The processor 130 may obtainthe second hardware identifier ID_(ME) from the memory 120 and comparethe obtained second hardware identifier ID_(ME) with the first hardwareidentifier ID_(N).

In step S130, the mobile equipment 100 compares the first sequencenumber SQN′_(N) obtained from the first extended sequence numberESQN_(N) with the second sequence number SQN′_(ME). The processor 130may obtain the second sequence number SQN′_(ME) from the memory 140 andcompare the obtained second sequence number SQN′_(ME) with the firstsequence number SQN′_(N).

In step S135, the mobile equipment 100 determines if the first hardwareidentifier ID_(N) matches the second hardware identifier ID_(ME). Theprocessor 130 may determine if both the first hardware identifier ID_(N)matches the second hardware identifier ID_(ME) by obtaining valuesstored in the memory 140. For example, a 1 may be stored in the memory120 if step S135 indicates that the first hardware identifier ID_(N)matches the second hardware identifier ID_(ME), and a 0 may be stored inthe memory 140 if the first hardware identifier ID_(N) does not matchsecond hardware identifier ID_(ME). If the processor 130 determines thefirst hardware identifier ID_(N) matches the second hardware identifierID_(ME), the processor 130 performs step S140, whereas if the processor130 determines the first hardware identifier ID_(N) does not match thehardware identifier ID_(ME), the processor performs step S155. Thisdescription of an example embodiment will proceed under the assumptionthat the first hardware identifier ID_(N) matches the second hardwareidentifier ID_(ME).

In step S140 of FIG. 6B, the mobile equipment 100 determines if thefirst sequence number SQN′_(N) obtained from the first extended sequencenumber ESQN_(N) is greater that a second sequence number SQN′_(ME). Thesecond sequence number SQN′_(ME) is stored in the memory 120 of themobile equipment 100 and may be based on time or a counter value aspreviously discussed. The processor 130 determines the first sequencenumber SQN′_(N) is a valid sequence number if the first sequence numberSQN′_(N) is greater than the second sequence number sequence numberSQN′_(ME) stored in the memory 120. Further, the processor 130determines the first sequence number SQN′_(N) is an invalid sequencenumber if the first sequence number SQN′_(N) is less than the secondsequence number SQN′_(ME) stored in the memory 120. If the firstsequence number SQN′_(N) is determined to be a valid sequence number,the first sequence number SQN′_(N) may be stored in the memory 120 bythe processor 130 and used as the second sequence number SQN′_(ME) inprocesses the next time a network authentication token AUTN′ and randomnumber RAND_(N) are received from the intermediary IMS components 200 a.

As shown in FIG. 6B, the mobile equipment 100 performs step S145 if themobile equipment 100 determines the first sequence number SQN′_(N) is avalid sequence number. In step S145, the mobile equipment 100 generatesa response message RES. For example, the processor 130 generates aresponse message RES by combining the random number RAND_(N) receivedfrom the intermediate IMS components 200 a with the secret key K_(ME)stored in the removable unit identity module RUIM using function f7.Function f7 was previously mentioned with respect to FIG. 4.

In step S150, the mobile equipment 100 transmits the response messageRES to the IMS network 20. For example, the transceiver 140 transmitsthe response message RES to the intermediary IMS components 200 a of theIMS network 20.

As shown in FIGS. 6A and 6B, the mobile equipment 100 performs step S155if the mobile equipment 100 determines at least one of (i) the firstmessage authentication code MAC′_(N) does not match the second messageauthentication code MAC′_(ME), (ii) the first hardware identifier ID_(N)does not match the second hardware ID_(ME), and (iii) the first sequencenumber SQN′_(N) is not greater than the second sequence numberSQN′_(ME).

For example, condition (ii) is satisfied when the removable unitidentity module RUIM is removed from a first mobile equipment and placedin a second mobile equipment that is different from the first mobileequipment. Because the hardware identities of the first and secondmobile equipment are different, the network 20 would be using thehardware identifier ID_(N) of the first mobile equipment, which may havebeen the mobile equipment used by a subscriber when the subscriber firstregistered for an IMS service, and the hardware identifier ID_(ME) beingused by the second mobile equipment is the hardware identifier of thesecond mobile equipment, which includes the removable unit identitymodule RUIM.

Still referring to FIG. 6B, the mobile equipment 100 generates aresynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)), which includes aresynchronization message MACS and the second extended sequence numberESQN_(ME) in step S155. The resynchronization message MACS is calculatedin a manner similar to the second message authentication code MAC′_(ME).However, resynchronization message MACS includes the second extendedsequence number ESQN_(ME) instead of the first extended sequence numberESQN_(N) obtained from the network authentication token AUTN′. Togenerate the resynchronization message MACS, the processor 130 of themobile equipment 100 combines the second extended sequence numberESQN_(ME) with the random number RAND_(N) and the authenticationmanagement field AMF using a function f6*, which is different fromfunction f6 used to calculate the first message authentication codeMAC′_(N) and the second message authentication code MAC′_(ME).

In step S160 of FIG. 6B, the mobile equipment 100 transmits thegenerated resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)) to the IMS network20. For example, the transceiver 140 of the mobile equipment 100transmits the resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)) including theresynchronization message MACS and the second extended sequence numberESQN_(ME) to the intermediary IMS components 200 a of the IMS network20.

Referring back to FIG. 5, a response is transmitted from the mobileequipment 100 to the intermediary IMS components 200 a of the IMSnetwork 20 (4). According to an example embodiment, the response iseither the response message RES generated in step S145 of FIG. 6B or theresynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)) generated in step S155 of FIG.6B.

FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating an example embodiment of a methodperformed by the IMS network 20. In step S200 of FIG. 7, the IMS network20 receives the response transmitted by the mobile equipment 100. Forexample, the intermediary IMS components 200 a receive the responsetransmitted by the transceiver 140 of the mobile equipment 100.

In step S210 of FIG. 7, the IMS network 20 compares the receivedresponse with the expected response XRES previously obtained from theauthentication vector AV′. For example, the intermediary IMS components200 a compare the received response RES to the expected response XRESpreviously extracted from the authentication vector AV′ provided by theIMS home system 300. It is noted that while step S210 illustrates anactual comparison of the received response with the expected responseXRES, an alternative embodiment detects an indicator included in thereceived response and determines if the received response is a responsemessage RES or a resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)) from theindicator.

Assuming the IMS network 20 performs step S220 illustrated in FIG. 7,the received response matches the expected response XRES. The receivedresponse may match expected response XRES if the received response is aresponse message RES. In step S220, the intermediary IMS components 200a establish a mutually authenticated communication channel betweenmobile equipment 100 and the network 20 over which various servicesprovided by an IMS serving system may be provided. The IMS servingsystem may be the IMS home system 300 or the IMS visited system 400.However, as previously mentioned, the serving system in this exampleembodiment is considered to be the IMS visited system 400 which isincluded in the intermediary IMS components 200 a. The establishment ofthe mutually authenticated communication channel is represented in FIG.5 by (5 a). Secure communication is provided over the mutuallyauthenticated communication channel at least in part because both themobile equipment 100 and the network 20 possess the cipher key CK andthe integrity key IK.

Alternatively, the IMS network 20 performs step S230 when the receivedresponse does not match the expected response XRES. For example, if thereceived response is the resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)), theintermediary IMS components 200 a of the IMS network 20 will determinethe received response does not match the expected response XRES.

In step S230, the IMS network 20 calculates another authenticationvector AV″ based on the second extended sequence number ESQN_(ME)included in the resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)). For example,referring back to FIG. 5, the intermediary IMS components 200 a transmitthe resynchronization pair MACS, ESQN_(ME)) along with theauthentication management field AMF and the random number RAND_(N) tothe IMS home system 300 (5 b). The IMS home system 300 extracts thesecond extended sequence number ESQN_(ME) from the resynchronizationpair (MACS, ESQN_(ME)) and uses the random number RAND_(N), theauthentication message field AMF, and the secret key K_(N) to generatethe authentication vector AV″ as was previously described with respectto FIG. 4. The previously described steps illustrated in the signaldiagram of FIG. 5 and the flow charts of FIGS. 6A, 6B and 7 are thenrepeated as necessary.

As described above, example embodiments use an extended sequence numberESQN to establish a mutual authentication channel between a home IMSsystem 300 and/or a visited IMS system 400. Further, an extendedsequence number ESQN may be a hardware identifier concatenated with asequence number SQN. Accordingly, if hardware identifier is 56 bits, theextended sequence number ESQN is 56 bits longer than a conventionalsequence number.

Accordingly, the additional example embodiments described below aredirected towards compensating for the increased length of the ESQN.

Referring back to FIG. 5, signal (3) illustrates the intermediary IMScomponents 200 a transmitting the authentication token AUTN′ and therandom number RAND to the mobile equipment 100. In the following exampleembodiment, an assumption is made that the intermediary IMS components200 a have a limited number of bits, which may be transmitted to themobile equipment 100. The limited number of bits corresponds to a numberof bits required to transmit a random number RAND and authenticationtoken AUTN used in conventional methods such as the IMS securityprotocols described in the background section of this disclosure. Forexample, assume the limited number of bits is 200 bits and 80 of thebits are allocated for the random number RAND with the 120 remainingbits being allocated for the authentication token AUTN. In this example,the 120 bits of the authentication token are allocated as follows: 48bits allocated to a conventional sequence number SQN (or the sequencenumber SQN masked with the anonymity key AK), 16 bits allocated to AMFand 56 bits allocated to the message authentication code MAC.

Based on the above assumptions, in order for the intermediary IMScomponents 200 a to perform according to the example embodimentsdescribed with respect to FIGS. 5, 6A, 6B and 7, the mobile equipment100 and the authentication center 310 reallocate the limited number ofbits so that the bits of the hardware identifier can be included in thetransmission. Further, assume the hardware identifier is 56 bits andthus, 56 bits of the 200 bits, i.e., the limited number of bits, must bereallocated.

In one example of reallocating bits, the authentication center 310 onlyincludes a 34 bit sequence number SQN′_(N) in an example embodiment ofthe authentication vector AV′ instead of the 48 bits originallyallocated to the sequence number SQN, thereby reallocating 14 bits forthe hardware identifier ID_(N). In addition, the authentication center310 may only include a 38 bit random number RAND in the exampleembodiment of the authentication vector AV′ instead of the 80 bitsoriginally allocated to the sequence number SQN, thereby reallocating 42bits for the hardware identifier ID_(N). As such, 56 bits arereallocated by the authentication center 310 for the hardware identifierID_(N) by reducing the number of bits of the sequence number SQN by 14and reducing the number of bits of the random number by 42 bits.

In another example of reallocating bits, the mobile equipment 100 mayreallocate bits assigned to a conventional resynchronization messageused in conventional IMS security protocols to accommodate the bits ofthe hardware identifier ID_(ME) included in the second extended sequencenumber ESQN_(ME) included in a resynchronization pair (MACS, ESQN_(ME))of example embodiments of the present invention.

In still another example embodiment, the first extended sequence numberESQN_(N) included in the network authentication vector AV′ includes ahash of the first hardware identifier ID_(N), assuming that theintermediary IMS components 200 a have a limited number of bits that maybe transmitted to the mobile equipment 100. Referring back to step S120of FIG. 6A, the mobile equipment 100 processes the first extendedsequence number ESQN_(N) extracted from the network authentication tokenAUTN′. If the first extended sequence number ESQN_(N) includes a hash ofthe first hardware identifier ID_(N), instead of the first hardwareidentifier ID_(N), the processor 130 separates the first extendedsequence number ESQN_(N) into the first sequence number SQN′_(N) and thehash of the first hardware identifier ID_(N). The processor then obtainsthe second hardware identifier ID_(ME) from the memory 120 of the mobileequipment 100, processes the second hardware identifier ID_(ME) usingthe same hash function used by the network 20 to hash the first hardwareidentifier ID_(N), and compares the hash of the second hardwareidentifier ID_(ME) generated by the mobile equipment 100 with the hashof the first hardware identifier ID_(N) provided by the network 20.

The invention being thus described, it will be obvious that the same maybe varied in many ways. Such variations are not to be regarded as adeparture from the spirit and scope of the invention, and all suchmodifications as would be obvious to one skilled in the art are intendedto be included within the scope of the present invention.

1. A method performed by mobile equipment to communicate with a network,the method comprising: receiving a network authentication token andrandom number, the network authentication token including a firstmessage authentication code and a first extended sequence number thatincludes a first hardware identifier and a first sequence number; andauthenticating the network based on the first message authenticationcode, the first hardware identifier, and the first sequence number. 2.The method of claim 1, further comprising: extracting the first messageauthentication code and the first extended sequence number from thenetwork authentication token; calculating a second messageauthentication code based on the random number, the first extendedsequence number, and a key stored in the mobile equipment; andprocessing the first extended sequence number to obtain the firsthardware identifier and a first sequence number.
 3. The method of claim2, wherein the authenticating step compares the first messageauthentication code with the second message authentication code, thefirst hardware identifier with a second hardware identifier stored inthe mobile equipment, and the first sequence number and a secondsequence number stored in the mobile equipment; and authenticates thenetwork if the first message authentication code matches the secondmessage authentication code, the first hardware identifier matches thesecond hardware identifier, and the first sequence number is greaterthan the second sequence number.
 4. The method of claim 3, wherein thefirst hardware identifier refers to a mobile equipment associated with asubscriber of the network and the second hardware identifier identifiesthe mobile equipment that received the network authentication token andrandom number.
 5. The method of claim 3, wherein the second sequencenumber is based on one of a time detected by the mobile terminal and acounter.
 6. The method of claim 3, further comprising: overwriting thefirst sequence number with the second sequence number if the secondsequence number is greater than the first sequence number; and testing anext obtained first sequence number with the second sequence number tovalidate the next obtained first sequence number.
 7. The method of claim1, further comprising: obtaining the key stored in a removable unitidentity module inserted into the mobile equipment; performing acryptographic transformation of the random number using the obtainedsecret key; and transmitting the cryptographic transformation of therandom number as a response if the authenticating step authenticates thenetwork.
 8. The method of claim 3, further comprising generating aresynchronization pair if at least one of the first messageauthentication code does not match the second message authenticationcode, the first hardware identifier does not match the second hardwareidentifier, and the first sequence number is less than the secondsequence number; and transmitting the resynchronization pair to thenetwork.
 9. The method of claim 8, further comprising: reallocating bitsof a first protocol resynchronization pair, the first protocolsynchronization pair having a preset number of bits assigned to each ofa first protocol resynchronization message and a first protocol sequencenumber; transmitting a second resynchronization pair having the samenumber of bits as the first protocol resynchronization pair, the bitsreallocated in the reallocating step being used as bits of the secondextended sequence number that has a greater number of bits than thefirst protocol sequence number.
 10. The method of claim 3, wherein thegenerating step concatenates the second hardware identifier and thesecond sequence number to create a second extended sequence number,calculates a resynchronization message based on the random number, thesecond extended sequence number, and a key stored in the mobileequipment, and groups the second extended sequence number with theresynchronization message to form the resynchronization pair.
 11. Amethod performed by a network to communicate with mobile equipment, themethod comprising: transmitting a random number and an authenticationtoken to the mobile equipment, the authentication token including afirst extended sequence number that includes a hardware identifier ofthe mobile equipment associated with a subscriber; receiving a responsefrom the transmitting step, the response being at least one of acryptographic transformation of the random number and aresynchronization pair including a second extended sequence number and aresynchronization message.
 12. The method of claim 11, furthercomprising: generating a first authentication vector including thenetwork authentication token, the first authentication vector is aconcatenation of the random number, an expected response, a cipher key,an integrity key, and the authentication token.
 13. The method of claim12, further comprising: comparing the response from the transmittingstep to the expected response; and authenticating the mobile equipmentif the response from the transmitting step matches the expectedresponse.
 14. The method of claim 12, further comprising: comparing theresponse from the transmitting step to the expected response; andgenerating a second authentication vector if the response from thetransmitting step does not match the expected response, the secondauthentication vector including a second network authentication tokenhaving the second extended sequence number; and transmitting the secondauthentication token to the mobile equipment.
 15. The method of claim12, further comprising: detecting an indicator included in the responsefrom the transmitting step, the indicator indicating the response is oneof a cryptographic transformation of the random number and theresynchronization pair; authenticating the mobile if the indicatorindicates the response is the cryptographic transformation of the randomnumber and the cryptographic transformation of the random number matchesthe expected response; and generating a second authentication vector ifthe indicator indicates the response is the resynchronization pair, thesecond authentication vector including a second network authenticationtoken having the second extended sequence number; and transmitting thesecond authentication token to the mobile equipment.
 16. The method ofclaim 11, further comprising: reallocating bits of a first protocolnetwork authentication token, the first protocol network authenticationtoken having a preset number of bits assigned to each of a firstprotocol sequence number, authentication messaging field, and a messageauthentication code; generating an authentication vector including asecond protocol network authentication token, the second protocolnetwork authentication token having the same number of bits as the firstprotocol network authentication token, the reallocated bits being usedas bits of the first extended sequence number that has a greater numberof bits than the first protocol sequence number; and the transmittingstep transmits the second protocol network authentication token as thenetwork authentication token.
 17. A method of establishing a mutuallyauthenticated communication channel between a mobile equipment and anetwork, the method comprising: (a) generating an expected response, arandom number, and a network authentication token, the networkauthentication token including a first message authentication code and afirst extended sequence number that includes a first hardware identifierbeing associated with the mobile equipment by the network; (b)transmitting the random number and the network authentication token fromthe network to the mobile equipment; (c) receiving the random number andthe network authentication token at the mobile equipment; (d)authenticating the network based on the network authentication token;(e) transmitting a cryptographic transformation of the random numberfrom the mobile equipment to the network; (f) authenticating the mobileequipment if the cryptographic transformation of the random numbermatches the expected response; and (g) establishing a mutuallyauthenticated channel between the mobile station and the network. 18.The method of claim 17, wherein the network authenticating step (d)extracts the first message authentication code and the first extendedsequence number from the authentication token, calculates a secondmessage authentication code based on the random number, the firstextended sequence number, and a key stored in the mobile equipment,separates the first extended sequence number to obtain the firsthardware identifier and a first sequence number, compares the firstmessage authentication code with the second message authentication code,the first hardware identifier with a second hardware identifier storedin the mobile equipment, and the first sequence number with a secondsequence number stored in the mobile equipment, and authenticates thenetwork if the first message authentication code matches the secondmessage authentication code, the first hardware identifier matches thesecond hardware identifier, and the first sequence number is greaterthan the second sequence number.
 19. The method of claim 18, furthercomprising: resynchronizing the mobile equipment and the network if atleast one of the first message authentication code does not match thesecond message authentication code, the first hardware identifier doesnot match the second hardware identifier, and the first sequence numberis less than the second sequence number
 20. The method of claim 19,wherein resynchronizing step includes concatenating the second hardwareidentifier and the second sequence number to create a second extendedsequence number, calculating a resynchronization message based on therandom number, the second extended sequence number, and a key stored inthe mobile equipment, grouping the second extended sequence number withthe resynchronization message to form the resynchronization pair,transmitting the resynchronization pair, generating a second networkauthentication token using the second extended sequence number, andrepeating the steps (b)-(f) substituting the second networkauthentication token for the network authentication token.
 21. A methodperformed by mobile equipment to communicate with a network, the methodcomprising: receiving a network authentication token and random number,the network authentication token including a first messageauthentication code and a first extended sequence number that includes ahash of a first hardware identifier and a first sequence number; andauthenticating the network based on the first message authenticationcode, the hash of the first hardware identifier, and the first sequencenumber.
 22. A method performed by a network to communicate with mobileequipment, the method comprising: transmitting a random number and anauthentication token to the mobile equipment, the authentication tokenincluding a first extended sequence number that includes a hash of afirst hardware identifier of a mobile equipment associated with asubscriber; receiving a response from the transmitting step, theresponse being at least one of a cryptographic transformation of therandom number and a resynchronization pair including a second extendedsequence number and a resynchronization message.